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The Export-Import Bank of the United
States' Battle Against Subsidized Export
Credits
Dean C. Alexander*
I.

Introduction

The purpose of this article is multi-faceted. Part I provides an
overview of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank). Part II defines'and analyzes export credits. Part III describes how export credits encourage the promotion of exports. Part
IV furnishes an overview of mixed credits. Part V focuses on the use
of tied aid credits. Part VI explains which nations promote exports
through the use of tied aid credits and mixed credits. Part VII discusses what type of exports are generally assisted by tied aid credits
and mixed credits. Part VIII examines the various mechanisms
which the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the European Community use to regulate tied aid
credits and mixed credits. Part IX explains the United States' response to the growth of tied aid credits and mixed credits. Finally,
Part X concludes that the use of subsidized export finance threatens
United States export sales. as well as "free export credits," and consequently, "free trade."
II.

The Export-Import Bank of the United States

The primary role of Eximbank is "to aid in financing and to
facilitate exports and imports and the exchange of commodities between the United States or any of its Territories or insular possessions and any foreign country or the agencies or nationals thereof."'
Furthermore, Eximbank's task includes providing assistance to exLL.M. (International & Comparative Law), Georgetown University Law Center (expected 1991); J.D., American University, Washington College of Law; Dipl6me, Graduate
Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland (thesis in preparation); B.A., Georgetown University. Mr. Alexander is also author of The Legal and Economic Impact of the
Federal Reserve Board's Ruling to Allow U.S. Depository Institutions to Accept Foreign Currency Deposits, 14 N.C. J. OF INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 459 (1989). This Article is dedicated to
my parents.
1. Eximbank was originally organized under the name the Export-Import Bank of
Washington, pursuant to Executive Order 6,581 of Feb. 2, 1934. The Export-Import Bank Act
of 1945, ch. 341, § 4, 59 Stat. 528 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(1) (1982)).
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pand exports since this activity is important "to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to
the increased development of the productive resources of the United
States." 2 Additionally, Eximbank's charter requires that the credit
institution provide competitive terms and interest rates on export
credits relative to those of other nations.' Eximbank's role in export
financing complements private financing sources in the U.S." Eximbank also plays an important role in expanding export sales by
U.S. small and medium-sized companies."
Eximbank engages in numerous activities and programs
designed to achieve its tasks. For example, the Eximbank provides
various guarantee programs. Among these are the "Eximbank Preliminary Commitment," which involves offers from the Eximbank on
specific transactions, including the terms and conditions of guarantee/loan support.6 The Eximbank also offers the "Eximbank Working Capital Guarantee" which provides eligible exporters with the
capacity to obtain various working capital loans from commercial
lenders. 7 Finally, the "Eximbank Guarantee" guarantees the repayment of export credits from either foreign or U.S. lenders to foreign
purchasers of U.S. exports."
The Eximbank employs loans in its effort to facilitate U.S. exports. Among these are the "Eximbank Direct Loan," providing
funding to foreign purchasers of U.S. exports that encounter credit
subsidies from other nations. 9 The Eximbank also provides an "Eximbank Intermediary Loan," which includes fixed interest rate lending to actors that extend OECD minimum fixed rate credits to purchasers of U.S. exports that compete with government-sponsored
competition.' 0
The Eximbank also has an agency and reinsurance program
2. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(l)(A) (1982).
3. 12 US.C. § 635(b)(l)(B) (1982 & Supp. i1 1985).
4. Id. See Orr, Hot Prospect: Trade Finance, A.B.A. BANK. J., Sept. 1988 at 76-80
(explaining export credit financing by private banks); J.HILLMAN, THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
AT WORK: PROMOTIONAL FINANCING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 3-14 (1982) (providing an overview of Eximbank's role in export credit financing).
5. See Gage, Middle-Market Firms Find Exim Pilot Fills Trade Finance Gap, CASH
FLOW, July 1988, at 6-10 (discussing Eximbank's role in guaranteeing export trade financing
for small and middle-market businesses). See also Lawrence, Export-Import Bank Playing
Lead Role in Bush Trade Policy, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14, 1990, at 14F (explaining that
U.S. will launch more aggressive subsidized export credit program).
6. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES. PROGRAM SELECTION GUIDE I
(Oct. 1989) [hereinafter EXiM GUIDE]. See 12 C.F.R. § 400-410 (1990) (discussing various
rules and regulations regarding Eximbank). For an extensive overview of Eximbank's activities
see CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, CHASE GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES
141-55 (1985) [hereinafter CHASE].
7. EXIM GUIDE, supra note 6, at I.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 4.
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with the Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA), an association of U.S. marine, property and casualty insurance corporations,
that offers export credit insurance policies. 1
The FCIA offers insurance policies designed to cover most types
of export credit sales. The "FCIA New-to-Export Insurance Policy,"
is a one-year blanket policy insuring short-term export credit sales."
The "FCIA Umbrella Insurance Policy" meets the needs-of those
who have not used FCIA in the past two years and who have average annual export credit sales of less than $2 million for the previous
two years, by providing a one-year blanket policy for short-term export credit sales. 3
The "FCIA Bank Letter of Credit Insurance Policy" is a oneyear blanket policy insuring commercial banks against any loss on
irrevocable letters of credit issued by foreign banks for U.S. exports. " ' This policy applies only to irrevocable letters of credit issued
by a foreign bank for which the insured has an approved issuing
bank credit limit.' 6 Individual short-term loans to foreign purchasers
of exports of U.S. goods and services may be insured by the "FCIA
Financial Institutions Buyer Credit Insurance Policy."'" The "FCIA
Multi-Buyer Insurance Policy" is a type of one-year blanket policy
which insures either short-term, medium-term, or a combination of
short-term and medium-term export credit sales. 7 The "FCIA
Short-Term Single-Buyer Insurance Policy" is a single-buyer policy
which insures individual short-term export credits sales. 8 The
"FCIA Medium-Term Single-Buyer Insurance Policy" is a singlebuyer policy which insures individual medium-term export credit
sales. "'9 Finally, the "FCIA Lease Insurance Policy" is a policy
which insures both the stream of lease payments and the fair market
value of leased products payments.20
III.

Export Credits: An Overview
A "credit" is a deferred payment for goods and services re-

II. Id. at inside cover. FCIA acts in unison with Eximbank in providing export credit
insurance. This insurance association was organized at the behest of Eximbank. See Lovell
Manuf. v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 843 F.2d 725 (3rd Cir. 1988); EXPORTIMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK: FINANCING FOR AMERI-

FOR AMERICAN JOBs 13-22 (1979). See also Chapman, The High
Utility of FCIA Insurance to Banks in Financing Trade, 9 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 439
(1986); Holden, Export Credit Insurance and the FCIA, 14 U.CC. L.J. 140 (1981).
12. EXIM GUIDE, supra note 6, at 5.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id.at I1.
20. Id.at 12.
CAN EXPORT-SUPPORT
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ceived. 21 Export credits are financing tools which are "tied directly
to the cross-border purchase of specific goods."'22 Consumers of export credits are generally from the Less Developed Countries23 because these nations are generally undercapitalized and lack foreign
exchange.24
21. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION,
FINANCE: CURRENT ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 35

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TRADE
(1988) [hereinafter TRADE FINANCE]. See
Eastern Europe, Tied Aid Will Focus On Export-Import Bank, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA)
No. II, at S-20 (Jan. 17, 1990), (the Bush administration will use export financing and tied
aid to help movement toward market economies in Eastern European nations).
22. THE WORLD BANK, THE ROLE OF EXPORT CREDITS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
FROM RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT 163 (Development Committee Report No. 4 1984). See
Murphy, Trade Finance: More Garnish Than Substance?, BANKER, March 1988, at 30 (discussing the utility and impact of export credits on exporter's competitiveness). See also Export
Financing Annual Survey of Developments in InternationalTrade Law: 1985, 16 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 527 (1986); Graham, Sources of Export Financing, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
455 (1984) (examining various institutions and mechanics of export financing).
A buyer credit is defined as a "[qinancial arrangement in which a bank and/or ECA
[Export Credit Agency] makes a loan. Generally the proceeds can only be used to purchase
specific imports. Disbursements may go either directly to the supplier or to reimburse the
buyer for payments already made to the supplier." CHASE, supra note 6, at 164-65.
Supplier credit financing is defined as a "[financial arrangement in which a bank or an
ECA makes a loan to the supplier often collateralized by the pledge of export receivables held
by the supplier. [The] Bank or ECA may purchase export receivables from the supplier. The
purchase of export receivables may be at par or at a discount and may be with full, limited or
no recourse to the supplier." Id. at 168.
23. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 35. See generally Duff, The Outlook for Official
Export Credits, 13 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 891 (1981).
24. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 35.
Export credit subsidies are bounties which are paid on specific export items so that a
nation can increase exports or a relevant industry can develop. DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
159 (5th ed. 1970). These credit subsidies are often utilized to finance both capital goods
(factories, buildings, and machinery) and large-scale investments such as infrastructure
projects (water projects, rail systems, and roads). ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEM IN OECD MEMBER
COUNTRIES 7 (1982). Generally, export credit subsidies occur when the government of the
exporting country provides the importing purchaser with financing terms more beneficial than
those accessible via non-public institutions. J. PEARCE, SUBSIDIZED EXPORT CREDIT 21 (1980).
The effect of these export credit subsidies is to shift resources from one portion of the economy
(taxpayers) to another (exporters), or, worse yet, to the importing nation, without a guarantee
of improving the terms of trade. In reality, some would argue that this form of non-tariff
distortion of trade misallocates resources and outputs, while actually exacerbating the terms of
trade. U.S. Trade Policy Phase 1: Administration and Other Public Agencies. Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 300
(1981) (statement of Marc Leland, Ass't Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Dept. of the Treas.). See also
Diamond, Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 771
(1989) (discussing the GATT Subsidies Code and the U.S. law definition of "subsidy").
In 1981, Mr. John D. Lange, Jr., then Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury,
detailed the various reasons for which countries subsidize their exports:
* Many countries suffer trade or current account deficits and seek to reduce the
deficit quickly.
* Some countries have economic policies biased in favor of state intervention for
favored sectors, such as the export sector. They lack understanding that this may
worsen their underlying competitive position.
* There is a belief that increasing exports through credit subsidization is a relatively inexpensive alternative to unemployment and welfare programs.
* Many have an "irrational conviction" that there is a proper or natural level for
interest rates, unreflected in week-to-week, month-to-month or even year-to-year
fluctuations.
* Some countries hope to compensate their industries for their smaller scale of
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Export credits of complex, high cost unit value goods and services include bulldozers, aircraft, power plants, and other capital
goods and services. The value of credit for these items often ranges
from $50,000 to $100 million, and these items possess repayment
periods which last approximately 10 years. The terms of this export
financing often mimic rates in the commercial market. 8
IV. Export Promotion Through the Use of Export Credits: General
Issues
In order to promote export growth, governments can offer interest rates below those generally available in the commercial arena.
These below-market credits will enable an exporter whose competition can provide goods and services of similar quality a distinct advantage. Thus, government intervention in export credits can result
in trade distortions. 6
The role of export financing is vital since the terms available
can have an impact on the final price paid by buyers. For example,
suppose that the governments of the United States and Japan manufacture the same type and quality of widgets and compete for a $1
million sale to a Less Developed Country (LDC). Under the terms of
their respective bids, Japan provides financing at 8 % over a 10-year
period, while the United States offers 9% for the same term (assuming both export credits are in United States dollars). Due to differences in these rates, over a 10 year period, the difference in interest
payments rises to $55,000. As a result, this 1 % variance in interest
on the export financing is equal to 5.5% of the $1 million contract.2 7
production, inefficiencies or other presumed disadvantages in the world export
market.
* There is a belief that export credit subsidies ease the debt burdens of the lesser
developed countries that receive the credits.
Marsh, Hopes Dim for Ending Predatory Financing, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June 8, 1981, at 199. Subsidized Exports Seen Causing Loss of 46.000 Jobs in U.S. in
1981, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 106, at L-I (June 2, 1982) (discussing a report
by the Labor-Industry Coalition for International Trade which states that officially subsidized
export credits in industrialized foreign countries have resulted in a loss of 46,000 American
jobs and at least $1.5 billion in U.S. exports).
25. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 34.
26. Id. at 36.
27. Id. Export-Import Bank, Cuts to.Eximbank Direct Loan Will Harm U.S. Competitiveness, Exporters Say, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 21, at B-10 (Jan. 31, 1990).
An actual example of the severe implications of export subsidies to U.S. corporations is provided by the case of a Westinghouse Electric Corporation bid in 1981:
Last year [1981], Westinghouse Electric Corp. lost to France's Framatome
a $1 billion contract to construct two nuclear reactors in Korea. It wasn't that
the French equipment was superior. Nor was Framatome's price significantly
lower than Westinghouse was prepared to bid. But Westinghouse never even got
to make a formal proposal because the French, using a winning combination of
high-level political pressure and low-cost financing, made an offer that even
America's Korean allies couldn't refuse. Compared to the best financing package
typically offered by America's Export-Import Bank, France's bid, covering 85%
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Thus, although both manufacturers were presenting identical products, the package with the most favorable financing, the Japanese
bid, would likely be chosen by the importer.
As an executive at Caterpillar Inc. explains, "[e]xport financing
is absolutely a key, part of export competitiveness. It's not always
enough to have a quality product at a competitive price - sometimes the financing itself determines what product is chosen." 2 8 Consequently, for U.S. goods and services to compete globally, they must
not only be of high caliber and competitively priced, but must also
offer aggressively priced export credits.
V. Export Promotion Through the Use of Export Credits: Mixed
Credits
Promotion of national exports also occurs when aid and trade
intersect. This situation is particularly apparent with mixed credits.
Mixed credits occur when donor governments combine a large portion of export financing with a smaller degree of aid.29 An example
provides a better comprehension of the scope of mixed credits.
A Country A contract offer of $2 million of Country A's goods
includes $1.6 million of export credits and $400,000 of aid to Country C. 30 The aid is composed of a grant (i.e., funds that do not need
to be repaid and which carry no interest). In contrast, Country B
offers an identically priced package of Country B's goods export
credits, but no aid is appended.3 1 All things being equal, Country A
would most likely receive the contract because the buyer would receive $2 million of goods, but would only be required to repay the
32
$1.6 million in principal, plus interest.
Although at first glance mixed credits appear to be in accord
with "fair" export financing practices (i.e., the interest rate of the
loan is in compliance with OECD guidelines), upon closer scrutiny,
one comprehends that part of the credit does not have to be repaid.
Nevertheless, nations that offer mixed credits maintain that their
"donations" are simply forms of aid for development programs.3 3 In
reality, these measures distort trade through subsidization of credit
of the project at a fixed interest rate of 7.6% over 22 years, will save the Koreans about $235 million, according to Westinghouse.
Reilly, Outgunned in the Export Credit War, DUN'S REV., July 1981, at 41.
28. Export-Import Bank, Cuts to Eximbank Direct Loan Will Harm U.S. Competitiveness, Exporters Say, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 21, at B-10 (Jan. 31, 1990).
29. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 39. "A mixed credit includes [public as well as]
some private funds. If the grant element is more than 25 percent, the credit is considered aid
and is not covered by the Guidelines." CHASE, supra note 6, at 163'
30. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 39.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 40.
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while promoting their nation's distinct commercial interests.3
Even though aid to LDCs could be provided by giving these nations monies and allowing them to choose how to use these funds,
political pressure in the donor country often prohibits such activity.3 5
Rather, aid is combined with traditional export financing, whereby
the donor country will be able to export its goods to the recipient
nation. More specifically, grant elements are determined by the present discounted value of future repayments of an aid loan against a
hypothetical loan at market rates, expressed as a percentage 31 (for
instance, an aid loan with a 70% of grant aid and 30% of market
loan).
Several explanations have been offered concerning the benefits
of mixed credits as aid. The first justification rests on the notion that
appending aid to export credits augments the donor nation's resources available for assisting LDCs.3 7 Second, adherents of mixed
credits as aid proffer that, for some LDCs, mixed credits are essential because these nations cannot afford traditional export financing
and are ineligible for credits involving high concessional aid.38 Yet,
debate remains regarding the extent to which mixed credit financing
plays a role in promoting attractive export projects, such as power
plants, locomotives, construction projects, and telecommunications.3 9
VI. Export Promotion through the Use of Export Credits: Tied Aid
Credits
"Tied aid" describes the practice of certain companies who offer
export credits financed through foreign aid assistance in the form of
lower interest rates to developing countries. Donor country subsidization of this export credit makes the interest rate which the importer
must pay much lower, thereby making the deal more attractive.'0
The term tied aid is also used to describe a situation in which a
government provides aid to a LDC on the condition that the latter
purchase goods and services from the export credit lender
government."
Tied aid credits inhibit the free market system in which American exports formerly competed. This view was expressed by Ex34. Id.
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id. at 40.
37. Id. at 41.
38. Id.
39. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 41.
40. Administration Expected to Present Tied Aid Recommendations to Capital Hill
Today, Washington Insider (BNA), (Sept. 12, 1989).
41. Rodes, U.S. Export-Import Bank: Changes With World Trading Environment, Bus.
AM. Nov. 9, 1987 at 2. "A tied aid credit is one which is provided for development and purposes financed exclusively from public funds." CHASE, supra note 6, at 163.
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imbank President and Chairman John Macomber, who said that tied
aid is "an enormously expensive subsidy for the whole world."14 2 Numerous American corporations have been hurt by tied aid credits offered by other developed nations. For example, for over 20 years,
M.W. Kellogg Company, a United States nitrogen fertilizer factory
manufacturer, sold these big-ticket items to China. 3 Yet in 1988,
the Chinese stopped purchasing from the Kellogg Company and began purchasing these items from French and Italian corporations."
This switch from American to European corporations, which cost the
Kellogg Company approximately $300 million, was due to tied aid
credits offered by the European governments, rather than because of
superior European technology or price. 5
Developing nations like to receive offers of tied aid credits because these incentives reduce the cost of their imports."' America's
principal trading partners rely on government-subsidized funding to
boost their exports. 7 As a result, many American exporters cannot
compete with offers sweetened by government-supported loans, unless similar United States government subsidization exists.4 8
While American use of mixed credits and tied aid has become
more prevalent in the 1980s, U.S. commercial banks have significantly reduced trade finance.49 The impetus for this change is diverse: U.S. banks have reduced risky foreign lending; 50 U.S. bank
51
stockholders have called for a severe reduction of foreign lending;
there has been a decline of "relationship banking" between banks
and U.S. exporters; 52 U.S. banks have shied away from this type of
lending because of its high-cost and low profitability; 53 and tax law
modifications of U.S. foreign tax credits have reduced its
54
desirability.
42.

"Bundling" Would Facilitate Exports to Mexico, Eximbank's Macomber Says, 7

Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 120, (Jan. 24, 1990).

43. Aeppel, U.S. Studies Use of Tied Aid, Christ. Sci. Mon., Aug. 30, 1989, at 9, col. I.
See The Export-Import Bank, Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1990, at C2, col. 2 ("The ExportImport Bank is making a $10.4 million grant to help China build a subway in Shanghai. The
grant will be part of a $23.1 million U.S. financing package to encourage the Chinese government to buy equipment from American companies, against competition from similar subsidies
offered by France and West Germany.").
44.
45.

Id.
Id.

46.
47.

Rodes, supra note 41, at 3.
TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 76. For a discussion of the European Economic

Community's procedures concerning export credits, see ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CORPORATION AND DEVELOPMENT. THE EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS IN

COUNTRIES 13-15 (1987) [hereinafter FINANCING SYSTEMS].
48. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 76, 78.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

78, 81.
82.
78.
81.
82.
83.

OECD

MEMBER
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VII. A Survey of Nations Which Promote Exports through the Use
of Tied Aid Credits and Mixed Credits
Various nations provide loans at less than fair market interest
rates in order to promote their countries' exports. The tied aid credit
and mixed aid credit programs of France, Italy, and Japan will be
addressed below.
A.

France

In France, mixed credits are viewed as an integral part of the
nation's export finance system and development assistance program. 55 French policy does not clearly distinguish between the.dominion of export credits and aid." The basis for such reasoning
stems from the French government's view that capital projects are
equally attractive to both French commercial and development resources.6 7 As a consequence, the French perceive that utilizing aid
resources for economic infrastructure areas such as power-generating
facilities, communications networks, and transportation systems,
8
ameliorates both social and economic conditions.5
In addition, the French government uses mixed credits as a
means of "stretching" economic development funding through combining these monies with commercial credits.5 The use of mixed
credits makes financing available to many developing nations who
otherwise could not receive funding sufficient to permit them to
purchase French exports.60
France, the "originator" of the mixed credit concept, uses several institutions to carry out these practices, including: the Direction
des Relations Economiques ,xtbrieures (DREE); the Treasury Department; the Banque Francaise du Commerce Ext rieur (which
provides OECD Arrangement-rate financing); and the Compagnie
Francaisedu Commerce Ext~rieur (a part-private, part-public insurance company which provides credit insurance for commercial financing). 6 Also, the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique
(CCCE), although not involved in mixed credits, acts as a develop55. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS. ON
TIED AID CREDIT PRACTICES 51 (1989) [hereinafter TIED AID CREDIT]. See generally Export

Credit Agencies Seek New Strategies, Euromoney Trade Finance Supp., Feb. 1989, at 5-8
(listing the various export credit agencies in France, Belgium, and the U.K.). For an overview
of French export credit mechanisms see FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra note 47, at 43-50.
56. TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 51.
57. Id.; See Eximbank Wants to Match "Last Minute" French Mixed Credit Offer,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 76, at L2, (Apr. 19, 1985) (discussing role of Eximbank in matching last-minute subsidized export financing in order to assist a U.S. power
equipment manufacturer).
58. TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 51.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 52.
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ment bank and offers tied, as well as untied, aid.6 2
The aforementioned government agencies distribute development assistance monies used for project financing through two main
schemes: (1) tied aid loans and grants provided by the CCCE and
(2) mixed credits granted under bilateral agreements or protocols. 63
The French use of mixed credits has increased since the mid1970s. For example, from 1977-78 to 1982-83, the amount of mixed
credits offered by France rose by more than 50%.6" Similarly, Treasury loans, which accounted for the concessional portion of mixed
credits, grew to 3.2 billion francs in 1987 from a figure of 1.7 billion
francs in 1979.65 Another indication of export credit growth is
demonstrated by the total lending of the CCCE (which accounts for
over half of project finance) which increased from 1.6 billion francs
in 1979 to 4.6 billion francs in 1983.66 Since the period 1984-87, the
financing totals have remained relatively stable.6" More recently,
however, from 1987 to 1988, the volume of French tied aid actually
68
decreased from 2.6 billion francs to 2.4 billion francs.
French mixed and tied credits benefit several key French industries, including transportation, electricity production, telecommunications, health, and agriculture. 69 Target projects of CCCE "productive investments" include transportation, telecommunications,
70
mining, rural development, and oil field development.
Although budget constraints will discourage significant increases in mixed and tied aid credits, French authorities are unlikely
to reduce tied aid practices. 71 After all, the French contend that discontinuing such assistance is both politically and economically undesirable. 2 As a result, the French are not interested in engaging in
negotiations regarding concessionality levels for mixed credits. 7 3
Given the recent changes in the OECD Arrangement 7 4 the French
government views any renegotiation of the Arrangement as premature. "5 Furthermore, the French government opposes the OECD's
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 55.
69. Id.
70. ld.
71. Id. at 56.
72. Id.
73. Id. Concessionality Level is defined as the difference between the nominal value of a
loan and the discounted present value of the future debt service payment to be made by the
borrower, expressed as a percentage of the nominal value of the loan. The discount rate is
differentiated by currency. Id. at 225.
74. See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
75. TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 56.
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program of consistently raising the level of concessionality.
B.

6

Italy

The Italian government views tied aid and mixed credits primarily as fair mechanisms with which to assist the development of
LDCs. Nevertheless, the Italian program is used aggressively to assist in the marketing of Italian goods and services abroad.77 As a
result, the Italian government is able to assist its own exports which,
in some cases, due to price and quality, would not otherwise be
competitive.7 8
The Mediocredito Centrale administers the mixed credit/tied
aid program through its Revolving Fund. 79 In 1987, legislation transferred policy formulation and aid implementation to the Interministerial Committee on Development Cooperation (CICS).8" The CICS
has set out strict guidelines for granting mixed credits and tied aid
credits. 8 1 The Italian mixed credit/tied aid scheme focuses on specific geographic areas which are designated as either "first priority"
82
or "priority" nations.
Regarding the scope of Italian mixed credit financing, it is useful to note that in 1988 a larger proportion of aid funds were
targeted for mixed credits. This enabled the Italians to comply with
a new Arrangement Guidelines, which required a 35% grant element, while still providing the same amount of mixed credit support.8 3 Additionally, 1984-86 statistics illustrate that 95%-98% of
Italian aid funds were tied aid funds.8 4 The volume of mixed credits
commitments rose from 158.3 million dollars to 358.2 million
85
dollars.
In contrast to other nations which provide tied aid/mixed credits for specific export sectors, Italy provides mixed credits to any sector if that arena is vital to the development of the recipient nation.8
The sectors to which these funds are applied include power generation, telecommunications, and petrochemicals projects.8 7
Id. at 56.
Id. at 69. For an in-depth discussion of Italian export credit activites, see FINANCING
SYSTEMS, supra note 47, at 81-90.
78. TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 69.
79. Id.; see also CHASE, supra note 6, at 67-68.
80. TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 69.
81. Id. at 71. Mixed credits must have a minimum grant element of 35%. Tied aid*
credits must have a minimum grant element of 50%. Id.
82. Id. at 70.
83. Id. For a discussion of the OECD Arrangement see infra notes 118-46 and accompanying text.
84. TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 71.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id. at 72-73.
76.
77.

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

C.

[Vol. 9:2

Japan

Japan's strategy presents an alternative to the approach taken
by the French and Italians. Japan's development assistance programs
have focused on LDCs infrastructure areas such as communications,
transportation, and energy8 Strengthening these sectors, the Japanese government holds, is important for the recipient nation's development.8 9 Yet, recently, Japan has focused on more traditional development assistance, such as expanding its support for health care,
medical care, education, and agricultural development; providing
greater assistance in aiding economic adjustment; and improving the
concessionality of its assistance programs.9 0
Numerous Japanese government agencies have important roles
in development assistance. For instance, development assistance
loans must be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
and the Economic Planning Agency. 9 Two important public corporations, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF-which
provides project lending) and the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (which provides technical and other grant funded assistance)
also play major roles in Japan's development assistance programs.9 2
Usually, Japanese development projects are supported by concessional Japanese OECF loans instead of commingling these loans
or grants with export credits. 93 However, OECF funds are sometimes
combined with export credit to assist Japanese exporters in matching
situations.9 4
Japanese pledges of tied aid, partial aid, and associated financing totaled 1.6 billion dollars in 1984, 1.9 billion dollars in 1985, 1.8
billion dollars in 1986, and 2.7 billion dollars in 1987. 95 Since Japan's domestic goal is to develop its economic base, it is not surprising that, in practice, Japanese telecommunications, energy, and
transportation are the main sectors benefitting from various types of
subsidized export credits. 96
88.

Id. at 77. See Ozawa, Japan's Largest Financier of Multinationalism, 20 J. WORLD
L. 599 (1986) (providing a thorough analysis of the Export-Import Bank of Japan).
See also FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra note 47, at 183-90 (discussing Japanese export credit
facilities and institutions).
89. TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 77.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 78.
95. Id. at 79.
96. Id. at 80.
TRADE

Spring 1991 ]

SUBSIDIZED EXPORT CREDITS

VIII. The Eximbank Study and the Center for Strategic and International Studies Report
In a recent study, the Eximbank analyzed the impact of tied aid
credit competition on five United States industries, namely: telecommunications; computers; electric power generating; rail transportation; and earthmoving.97 These five sectors were chosen for review
since they account for approximately seventy-five percent of foreign
tied aid activity and the companies selected represent between fifty
and one-hundred percent of the potentially affected companies
within each product line.98 The two main objectives of the Eximbank
study were to measure the ramifications of tied aid credits and to
address the consequences of the international competitiveness of the
sectors examined and the strength of the areas selected. 99 The conclusion of Eximbank's case-by-case, company-specific review was
that American companies have been losing export sales worth between 400 and 800 million dollars per year as a result of foreign tied
aid credit practices. 10 0
Most U.S. companies included in the Eximbank study reported
that they lost over ten percent .of their total sales to developing nations due to tied aid competition. 10 1 However, four sectors, including
large-scale computers, boilers, communications satellites, and heavy
earthmoving equipment, reported only minor losses.' 02
The Eximbank study exhibited that tied aid credits may have a
direct impact on the American economy through lost sales to developing nations.' Yet, since sales to these nations represent a marginal proportion of domestic output, it is improbable that the affected
industries would be more than slightly impaired by the loss of these
exports. The Eximbank report further noted that such conclusions
are particularly applicable to several categories of products including
radio communications equipment, transmission equipment, and telecommunications equipment.' 0 ' In other industries-railroad equipment, turbines, and satellite earth stations-the reduction of exports
to developing nations might have a significant negative impact on
U.S. domestic production levels. 0 5
The Eximbank study also found that American corporations are
moving their manufacturing plants from the United States to other
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 135-220.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 136.
at 138-39.
at 142.

at 146.
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nations in order to obtain foreign tied aid credit financing.1" 6 This
relocation has been witnessed to some degree in several sectors including turbines, boilers, locomotives, and transmission equipment.""
An example of this trend includes an American business which filled
an order through its Canadian subsidiary in order to meet the speci10 8
fications for Canadian tied aid financing.
Several important issues which the Eximbank addressed in its
study were criticized in a report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The CSIS study notes that losses to U.S.
exporters due to a weak tied aid policy are between 2.4 billion dollars and 4.8 billion dollars, rather than the 400 million to 800 million dollar figure presented by the Eximbank.'0 9 Part of the discrepancy may rest in CSIS' estimate that the value-of-capital goods
prospects in developing countries is between 10 billion and 12 billion
dollars, while Eximbank cites a market of only 4 billion to 6 billion
dollars. 1 0°
The CSIS report also attacks the Eximbank study as being both
incomplete and as underestimating the impact of the tied aid credit
practices of foreign nations."' First, CSIS contends that during
1984-87, the development assistance commitments for capital
projects by tied aid sponsors such as Italy, Japan, United Kingdom,
West Germany, France, and Canada totaled between 3.5 and 6.8
billion dollars."' These figures do not include tied aid use by Austria, Spain, Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium." 3 CSIS argued that
the breadth of tied aid offered is close to 11 billion dollars." 4 Second, the report asserts that the U.S. War Chest fund is hampered by
inadequate financing, lack of operational guidelines, and insufficient
policy goals."' In fact, CSIS suggests the 300 million dollar fund
earmarked in 1987 should be increased to 500 million dollars annually. 1' The study also suggests that the Agency for International
Development (AID) should establish a new capital project
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Industry Groups Charge Eximbank Report Misrepresents Tied Aid Effects on
U.S. Firms, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 94 (May 17, 1989).
109. E. PREEG, THE TIED AID CREDIT ISSUE: U.S. EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 36-39 (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Significant Issue Series, Vol. 11, No. 11, 1989).
110. Id.
I 1l. Lost Exports From Lack of Tied-Aid Policy Greater Than Eximbank Estimates.
Study Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 49, at 62 (Dec. 13, 1989).
112. E. PREEG, supra note 109, at 7.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Id. at 2. For an explanation of the U.S. War Chest see infra notes 163-64 and
accompanying text.
116. Id. at 27.
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program. 117
IX. Attempts to Regulate Mixed Credits and Tied Aid Credits
A.

The OECD Arrangement
In order to counteract export credit subsidization, the Organiza-

tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has completed several agreements aimed at ending this activity. Seven nations formed a "Consensus" which set standards for officially
supported export credits. 118 In the 1970's, the "Consensus" grew into
the "Gentleman's Agreement'." '
Although the "Gentleman's
Agreement" did not contain any provisions to punish violations, it
did institute minimum rates of interest, maximum terms of repayment, and minimum cash payments.1" 0 By October 1983, the OECD
had concluded an agreement known as the "Arrangement" which
allowed for interest rate loan adjustments every six months, provided
that the weighted average of five selected governments' bonds
changed by a minimum of .50 percent since the previous change. 21
On March 17, 1987, the Export Credit Group of the OECD,
after lengthy negotiations, amended the Arrangement.' 2 2 The new
amended arrangement (Amended Arrangement), which became effective July 15, 1987, provided, inter alia, maximum maturity terms
117. Id. at 26-28.
118. Bohn, Eximbank's Role in International Banking and Finance: Loans, Reschedulings, and Development, 20 INT'L LAw. 829, 831 (1986). See generally Moravcsik, Disciplining
Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement, 43 INT'L ORG. 173 (1989) (discussing the current status of the OECD export credit arrangement). See also CHASE, supra note 6,
at 157-60 (discussing the international union of credit and investment insurers).
119. Bohn, supra note 118, at 831.
120. Id. at 831-32.
121. Id. at 832. As of 1986, the basket of currencies, and their respective weights, were:
U.S. dollar (42%); German mark (19%); Japanese yen (15%); Pound Sterling (12%); and
French Franc (12%). The subsequent minimum rates arising from the Arrangement are actually a continuum of two spheres: three sectors of nations and two types of repayment terms.
Category I, termed the "relatively rich" countries, include the United States, Japan, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, as well as most nations of Western and Eastern Europe. Category II,
called the "relatively poor" countries, consist of those nations eligible for International Development Agency (IDA) aid of the World Bank and those nation-states that are not members of
the World Bank as well as those ineligible for IDA assistance, though eligible because of per
capita gross national products (GNP). Id. See Mendelsohn, Cost Seen As Reason for Reduced
Size of Export Credit Subsidies; Major Industrialized Countries Join to Limit Competition,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 2, 1985, at 2 (relating OECD Arrangement and rising costs connected with
export credits). See also FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra note 47, at 231-55 (providing the text of
OECD Arrangement and Protocol as of May 1986).
122. Eximbank Announces Effective Dates for OECD-Approved Tied Aid Credit, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 31, at 981 (Aug. 5, 1987) [hereinafter OECD-Approved Tied
Aid Credit]. See also Mann, Four Nations in Accord on Exports of Aircraft, AVIATION
WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Aug. 10, 1981, at 25. See also, Trade Directorate of the
OECD, Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, reprinted in U.S.
Export Weekly (BNA), No. 196, at o-l (Feb. 28, 1978) (discussing how the Export Credit
Group of the OECD formulated "Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credit"), Trade
Policy; OECD Adjusts Reference Rates On Government Export Credit, Daily Rep. For Executives (BNA), No. 180 (Sept. 16, 1988) (expressing OECD's change of interest rate).
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and minimum interest rates for subsidized export credits.1 2 The
rules set forth by the Amended Arrangement were to be implemented in several stages. First, a "minimum concessionality level"
(the minimum amount of grant funds that must be offered in each
transaction) for mixed credits was augmented to 30 percent from 25
percent.124 This change made it more expensive for nations to offer
tied aid.12 5 Second, the concessionality mark for the poorest developing countries, who often received the majority of tied aid, was increased from 25 percent to 50 percent.126 Third, the mechanism for
calculating the concessionality level was changed in order to make
tied aid deals more expensive for nations whose markets have low
interest rates, such as Switzerland, West Germany, and Japan. 2 7
Eventually, the minimum concessionality benchmark was increased
to 35 percent as a result of the Amended Arrangement. 28
Under the Amended OECD Arrangement, the interest rates
which various nations are charged on official export credit financing
depends upon their respective wealth.' 2 9 Nations are characterized,
for these purposes, as relatively rich, intermediate, and relatively
poor.130 More specifically, the Amended Arrangement provided, that
for the period between July 15, 1988, through at least January 15,
1989, newly-approved official export credits would be set at the following minimum levels:

Wealthy countries
More affluent developing
countries
Poorer developing countries

Credit Terms
2-5 Years
Over 5 Years
Market Rates
Market Rates
9.65%
8.30%

9.15%
8.30 % 31

It should be noted that these rates are subject to periodic adjustments. 132 In addition, these credit terms are not applicable to
strong currencies, such as the Swiss franc, Japanese yen, and West
German mark, which carry market interest rates under the
Amended Arrangement minimum rates. 33 Loans in these currencies
123. OECD-Approved Tied Aid Credit, supra note 122, at 981.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. E. PREEG, supra note 109, at 22.
129. Id.
130. See CHASE, supra note 6, at 161 (listing OECD country classifications of rich, intermediate, and poor countries).
131. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 38.
132. CHASE, supra note 6, at 162 (relating automatic adjustment of interest rates).
133. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 37-38 n.6.
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are available as long as the interest rate is unsubsidized. 3 " As a consequence, governments have several options: they may lend in a low
interest rate currency; lend in a high interest rate currency and subsidize down to the Amended Arrangement minimum; or forbear
from lending and guarantee private financing at market interest
rates. 13 5 Although the Amended Arrangement is in place, more affluent LDCs not parties to this agreement may use credit subsidies to
circumvent the spirit of the Amended Arrangement.' 3 6
While the Amended Arrangement covers a wide range of activities, not all sectors of trade are included within its restrictions. For
instance, special arrangements are set out regarding such sectors as
shipping, nuclear power plants, and commercial aircraft.13 7 Also,
special "understandings" are included regarding intermediate and
small aircraft. 138 The Amended OECD Arrangement does not cover
ships, agricultural sales, or defense articles. 1 9
Although the Amended Arrangement has resulted in some resolution of the tied aid and mixed credit phenomenon, no nation is
completely content with the present structure. 4 0 The United States,
West Germany, and the United Kingdom believe that raising the
minimum grant element of mixed credits will reduce the trade-distorting consequences of this subsidized financing.' 4" On the other
hand, since some economic benefits to both the recipients and providers of subsidized export credits occur, this type of financing will
likely continue in the future.
In September 1989, the Bush administration announced that it
would launch a new round of tied aid credit negotiations.' 2 These
new negotiations, in a multilateral scheme, are necessary in order to
reduce trade distortions and to guarantee that the development goals
of tied aid recipient countries are met. 4 3 Additionally, the United
States seeks progress in the following areas: effectively untying donor
countries' aid programs for capital projects; limiting the use of tied
aid in problem sectors and/or markets; limiting the use of relatively
134. Id. at 37 n.6.
135. Id. at 38 n.6.
136. Id.
137. Bohn, supra note 118, at 833.
138. Id. See FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra note 47, at 256-63, 267-78 (providing the text
of the protocol to the Arrangement regarding ships, nuclear power plants, and civil aircraft).
139. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 37 n.5.
140. Bohn, supra note 118, at 835.
141. Id.
142. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER
SECTION 15(G) OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1945 AS AMENDED (SECTION 19 OF
THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT OF 1986 PUBLIC LAW 99-472) 4 (1989) [hereinafter BANK
ACT].

143.
CREDIT

1989)

DEPARTMENT

OF TREASURY,

PRACTICES ADMINISTRATION
[hereinafter TREASURY].

REPORT

To

THE U.S. CONGRESS

RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

A U.S.

ON

RESPONSE

TIED

I

AID

(Sept.
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low-concessional aid to a certain proportion of a donor's total program; requiring open competitive bidding for transactions below a
certain concessionality level as a way of precluding commercially
motivated aid; banning the late introduction of tied aid credits into
project bidding; and otherwise improving guidelines to enhance the
14
developmental orientation of tied aid. '
Several countries, including France, want low-grant element
tied aid as well as parallel financing placed under the same rules as
mixed credits.1 45 Other nations would accept this extension of the
rules only if modest increases in the amount of the grant element are
permitted." 6
B.

The European Community's Efforts to Regulate Export Credits

Other recommendations for regulating tied aid credits were offered by the European Community." 4 7 The European Community
proposal, set forth in Spring 1986, recommended increasing the minimum grant element in two annual stages from 25 percent to 35 percent for most countries (to 50 percent for LDCs) and setting the
grant portion with a different and floating rate for each currency, to
48
exhibit the cost of funds in that currency."
The European Community proposal also focuses on the importance of distinguishing between development funding and export
credits. This distinction is useful to ensure that trade finance will be
free of distorting concessional funding.1 41 It is sometimes difficult,
however, to distinguish between the two. More specifically, while the
European Community could claim that it is providing development
financing to LDCs for infrastructure equipment, it may, at the same
time, be described as providing credits for its products.
X. The United States' Response to the Growth of Mixed Credits
and Tied Aid Credits
The United States generally opposed the use of tied aid credits
in the 1960's and early 1970's, noting that foreign aid funds should
be used essentially for developmental, rather than commercial, purposes.' 5 ° Opposition to American use of tied aid stems from two
other important sources. First, an effective tied aid policy would cost
U.S. taxpayers approximately thirty-five cents for every one dollar
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at
Bohn,
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

2.
supra note 118, at 836.
835.
836.

TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 14.
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worth of exports.15 1 Second, use of tied aid credits earmarks government funding to specific industries, places certain industries above
others, and thereby causes an industrial policy to emerge. 152 Although there are benefits to a calculated industrial policy, the United
States publicly contends that its official export credit system should
not be described as such a scheme. 53 In practice, such a designation
is warranted.
While the United States has provided LDCs with development
aid for many years, the U.S. government must now couple such
funding with offers of subsidized export credits.1 54 The United
States, which generally did not utilize this financing mechanism, led
the negotiations with other OECD countries to differentiate between
capital project/mixed credit financing and development assistance. 55
To display the seriousness with which the Reagan administration
viewed these discussions, President Reagan proposed funds for a
fund to counter OECD nations' mixed credit practices.1 5 6
Thus, in September 1985, the Administration asked Congress to
establish a $300 million fund (the War Chest) to assist the U.S. in
its negotiations with the OECD. 57 In 1985, Eximbank utilized the
War Chest appropriations for both offensive and defensive measures.1 58 However, in 1986, the use of the War Chest was limited to
promoting negotiations, rather than simply promoting exports.159
Also, in October 1986, a War Chest valued at $300 million was authorized, while only $100 million was appropriated. 0
Despite the limited funds which Eximbank had available in the
war chest, U.S. negotiators asserted that, in principle, the United
States could augment this fund to match any of its competitors. 6 1
The United States thereby demonstrated to the other OECD nations
151. The minimum grant element in OECD Arrangement for poorer countries is 35%.
As a result, if the U.S. provides a LDC with a tied aid package, a minimum of 35%- or 35
cents per I dollar - will be a grant; a cost to the U.S. taxpayer. See supra note 128 and
accompanying text. See also Administration Expected to Present Tied Aid Recommendations
to Capitol Hill Today, Washington Insider (BNA) (Sept. 12, 1989).
152. Farnsworth, U.S. To Press For Talks On Aid Tied To Exports, N.Y. Times, Sept.
12, 1989, at D20, col. 5; Dunne, U.S. To Launch Diplomatic Offensive Against tied Aid, Fin.
Times, Sept. 13, 1989, at 6. See Book Review, National Journal, Jan. 13, 1990, No. 2, at 95
(reviewing E. PREEG. THE TIED AID CREDIT ISSUE: U.S. EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (The Center for Strategic and International Studies Significant Issue series,
Vol. Xl, no, II 1990)).
153. See generally, TIED AID CREDIT, supra note 55, at 222.
154. See Rodes, supra note 41. See generally Aid Funds Should Be Used For Humanitarian Needs, Not Tied To U.S. Exports, Panel Told, Daily Report. for Exec. (BNA), No. 88,
(May 9, 1989).
155. Rodes, supra note 41.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. TRADE FINANCE, supra note 21, at 42.
160. Id.
161. TREASURY, supra note 143, at 4.
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that subsidized export financing could be provided by any nation,
while also demonstrating that such lending was costly and
62
inopportune.'
The War Chest, or Tied Aid Credit Fund, implemented in
March 1987, has been used primarily in a defensive manner - to
counter offers from nations that do not conform with the guidelines
set out in the 1987 OECD Arrangement. 6 The War Chest was established in order:
[A] to supplement the financing of a United States export
when there is a reasonable expectation that predacious financing
will be provided by another country for a sale by a competitor of
the United States exporter with respect to such export; (B) to
supplement the financing of United States exports to foreign
markets which are actual or potential export markets for any
country which the Bank determines - (i) engages in predacious
official export financing through the use of tied aid or partially
untied aid credits; and (ii) impedes negotiations to eliminate the
use of such credits for commercial purposes; or (C) to supplement the financing of United States exports under such other
circumstances as the Bank may determine to be appropriate for
carrying out the purpose of this section.""
Some elements of the Bush administration perceive that increased use and support of the War Chest is needed.'6 5 As a result,
for fiscal year 1990, the Bush Administration submitted a proposal
to continue the War Chest level at $100 million.1 66 This $100 million
War Chest, in conjunction with commercial funds guaranteed by Eximbank, will enable the United States to compete with other nations'
tied aid programs.' 67 Although the $100 million figure is not as large
as some years during the Reagan administration, War Chest funds
will be supplemented with foreign aid money from other agencies. 168
There are three possible approaches for implementation of the
War Chest program. Under the first alternative, the U.S. would target exports to markets of nations who frequently use tied aid credits
and at the same time oppose negotiations for reducing such credits. "1 9 Under the second method, often described as defensive, the
U.S. would match tied aid credit in other nations, regardless of
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2-3.
164. 12 US.C.A. sec. 635i-3(b)(1) (1989).
165. Letter from Nicholas F. Brady, Sec. of Treasury and John D. Macomber, Pres. and
Chairman of Eximbank to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House, (Sept. 11, 1989) at I
[hereinafter Brady].
166. TREASURY, supra note 143, at 3.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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whether the other nation opposes discussions on the subject. 17 Although this strategy would underscore the U.S.' disdain for tied aid
credits, because the U.S. offers are reactive, U.S. exporters capacity
to win these bids would be weakened.1 71 In the third and most aggressive approach, the War Chest would assist U.S. exporters to
from
compete in specific sectors and markets where competition
72
other nations' subsidized export credits is extensive.1
The Bush administration believes that the last option is the most
effective at the present time.' If international negotiations do not
progress as smoothly as the United States wishes, appropriations to
supplement the War Chest might be necessary.1 74 If the United
States is forced to increase appropriations for the War Chest, it
would exemplify the adage - if you can't beat them, join them.
To implement the third option, increased cooperation and support between the Agency for International Development (AID), the
Trade Development Program, and the Eximbank, particularly in
capital project financing, will be necessary. 1 75 Such cooperation
would serve to achieve several goals, particularly: assisting the development of the importing country; meeting Eximbank's creditor provisions; and strengthening U.S. position vis-a-vis its competitors.17
Additionally, a study of how U.S. aid programs can assist the development of nations through support for capital projects and infrastructure will be made. 7 7 Some officials at Eximbank expressed the
view that monies available from AID should support humanitarian
projects, rather than be earmarked for mixed credit export financing.17 1 Otherwise, the U.S. would provide export subsidies to certain
nations while at the same time depriving fundamental aid to
79
LDCs.'
170. Id.
17 1. Id. See Tied Aid Credit Practices. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Development. Finance, Trade, & Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance. and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 8-9 (1988) (discussing present difficulties facing U.S. exports due to tied aid credits). Omnibus Trade
Legislation (Vol. V), Hearing and Markup Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcomm. on Int'l. Economic Policy and Trade, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1988) (outlining U.S.
policy on mixed credits and tied aid financing).
172. TREASURY, supra note 143, at 4.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Aid Funds Should Be Used For Humanitarian Needs, Not Tied To U.S. Exports,
Panel Told, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 88 (May 9, 1989).
179. Id. See U.S. Official Calls for Steps to Boost U.S.-Soviet Trade, Reuter Business
Report, Jan. 22, 1990 (noting Eximbank President Macomber's desire to remove "legislative
underbrush" which impinges growth of U.S.-Soviet trade while Eximbank's foreign competitors - industrial nations' export credit agencies - already have provided $12 billion in financing to the Soviet Union).
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Another way to assist U.S. exporters of capital goods in obtaining financing for their buyers is through a practice called bundling. 180 In bundling, numerous small export credits are joined into
one large credit, which is then guaranteed by Eximbank. 18 1 Upon
obtaining the guaranty, this credit can be sold in capital markets to
institutional investors. 182 The benefit of this technique stems from
the fact that smaller foreign importers would be able to obtain financing without requiring U.S. banks to increase their loans to developing countries.' 8 3 The Eximbank Vice Chairman believes that
"bundling" will make more funding available to importing countries
and will increase U.S. exports. 84
Moreover, in recent years, the United States has provided tied
aid credits in order to compete with such practices by foreign governments. 8 5 The Eximbank has offered tied aid support to numerous
projects since 1987, including:
FY

Country

Project

Export Value

War Chest
Grant Amount

1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987

Gabon
Gabon
Brazil
Brazil
India
Thailand
Total

Earth Satellite Station
Cellular Telephones
Hospital Equipment
Airport Navigation Equipment
Gas Turbines
Capital Equipment

$ 21,2
$ 8.5
$ 35.0
S 52.6
$ 17.0
$100.0
$244.3

$ 5.3
$ 2.1
$ 8.7
$13.2
$ 8.8
$40.0
$78.1

1988
1988
1988

Jordan
Algeria
Total

Power Equipment
Telecommunications

$ 18.3
$ 16.0
$ 34.3

mil.
mil.
mil.
mil.
mil.

mil.
mil.
mil.
mil.
mil.

$ 5.5
$ 2.1
$ 7.6186

Additionally, as of October 20, 1989, the United States had
outstanding offers under the War Chest to
Country

Project

Tunisia
China
India
Indonesia
Indonesia

Airport Equipment
Shanghai Metro
Computer Equipment
Telephone Switching System
Satellite Communication Equipment 81

180. "Bundling" Would Facilitate Exports to Mexico, Eximbank's Macomber Says, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 120, (Jan. 24, 1990).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Rodes, supra note 41.
186. BANK ACT, supra note 142, attachment 3.
187. Id. attachment 2.
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With reference to computer equipment for India's hydroelectric
system, Eximbank offered a 40% concessionality level tied aid credit
following a British Government 30% concessionality offer the day
prior to the bid opening.188 This action by the British is a strategy
often utilized by nation's offering tied aid: the introduction of export
subsidies late in the contract bidding procedure in order to "steal"
business. 189 Although the U.K. later increased its grant offer to
100%, the United States supplier's goods were technically superior. 190 The Indian buyer has yet to decide which supplier to use."'
Similarly, immediately prior to a bid by an OECD nation for
the sale of gas turbines to Malaysia, British and French suppliers
offered a bid with tied aid credits, containing a 30% concessionality
level. 9 Because the buyer was informed of the availability of tied
aid well before the OECD participants were notified, the British and
French violated the Amended Arrangement.' 9 3 In response, Eximbank made an offer for a 40% concessionality level credit.' 9 4
More recently, in the highly competitive sale of a digital telephone system to Indonesia, the U.S. supplier, despite its technical
advantage, faced competitive financing schemes by suppliers from
France, Japan, and Australia, all of whom agreed to comply with an
Indonesian law, known as Impres 8, which sets terms for concessional loans. 195 Impres 8 requires a 100% loan with a maximum interest rate of 3.5 %, a minimum grace period of 7 years and a repayment term of 18 years. 96 These strict terms, corresponding to a
concessionality level of 41.64%, are generally required by the Indonesian Government on multinational tenders.' 9 7 This Indonesian law
exemplifies the added complexity of some statutes which encourage
the use of subsidized export credits.
XI.

Conclusion

The threat to United States exports posed by export subsidization is real and critical. Such an appraisal was recently echoed by
Congress which found that:
(1) tied aid and partially untied aid credits offered by other
countries are a predacious method of financing exports because
of their market-distorting effects; (2) these distortions have
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caused the United States to lose export sales, with resulting
losses in economic growth and employment; (3) these practices
undermine market mechanisms that would otherwise result in
export purchase decisions made on the basis of price, quality,
delivery, and other factors directly related to the export, where
official financing is not subsidized and would be a neutral factor
in the transaction; (4) support of commercial exports by donor
countries with tied aid and partially untied aid credits impedes
the growth of developing countries because it diverts development assistance funds from essential developmental purposes;
and (5) there should be established in the Bank [Eximbank] a
temporary tied aid program to target the export markets of
those countries which make extensive use of tied aid or partially
untied aid credits for commercial advantage for the purpose of
facilitating the negotiation of a comprehensive international arrangement restricting the use of tied aid and partially untied aid
credits for commercial purposes, and such a program should be
aggressively used until such an arrangement is established.' 98
Thus, the United States must continue to implement effective unilateral actions (e.g., increase the funding and use of the War Chest)
while on the multilateral level express its disdain for this form of
unfair export credit scheme and negotiate for its timely demise.
It appears that the United States is pursuing such a two-fold
strategy. First, in order to show its resolve during the OECD negotiations, the United States has increased the funding available to tied
aid credits. More'specifically, in May 1990, Eximbank and AID established a tied aid fund to assist United States exporters in selling
to four Asian nations: Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.' 99 Under this funding scheme, each country will be allocated
$125 million to be distributed among four sectors: transportation,
telecommunications, construction equipment, and power.20 0 The purpose of this $500 million fund is to challenge several affluent nations
who have used aid to promote their exports to LDCs.2 01 As aptly put
by Eximbank Vice Chairman Lawson, this tied aid project "[is]
designed to fight fire with fire." 20 2 Second, during the OECD negotiations in July 1990, the United States fervently urged that all nations must exclude the use of tied aid credits in specific business sectors, including power generation, telecommunications, and
transportation.203
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While the U.S. approach to countering subsidized export credits
of other nations with its own loans could be viewed in the short-run
as hypocritical, it may, in the long run, prove faithful to the U.S.
goal of reducing this form of trade-distorting financing. Such a view
is credible if increased use of subsidized credit by the U.S. is so extensive that it will cause other such government creditors, who cannot allocate such funds for export financing, to call for the prohibition of subsidized export credits. However, creditors of subsidized
export funds may have a much stronger resolve than at first perceived, and thus, augmented utilization of subsidized export credits
by the U.S. will not cause'the former to abandon their strategy. Additionally, the U.S. public and private sectors, upon witnessing huge
rises in U.S. exports attributed to U.S. subsidized export credits,
could be less inclined to call a stop to this method of financing.

ness Report, July 18, 1990.

